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ADAMS THESIS AND THE LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF
CONDITIONALS
Abstract. Adams' Thesis states that the probability of a conditional is the prob-
ability of the consequent conditional on the antecedent. S. Kaufmann introduced a
rival method, the so-called \local interpretation", for calculating the probability of
a conditional that, according to a purported majority, squares better with intuition
in some circumstances. He also gives an example purporting to show that this new
method sometimes corresponds to rational action. We challenge the intuitions and
expose a mathematical error in the example. We also oer a model for the local
interpretivist semantics. This model puts theoretical local interpretivists on ground
as solid as that of Thesis abiders for whom conditionals have truth conditions.
1. Local Probabilities for Conditionals
Stefan Kaufmann (2004) introduces a method for predicting \strength of belief" (of a
purported majority of speakers) in some conditionals. It (the method) is intended as
a complement to (and sometime rival of) the so-called Adams Thesis (Adams 1996,
p. 3), according to which the \probability" of a conditional A ! C should be the
conditional probability P (CjA). Kaufmann presents a scenario in which one is about
to draw a ball from one of two bags. The likelihood of drawing from each bag, as
well as the contents of each bag, are given in the following table.
P (Bag X) = 1
4
P (Bag Y ) = 3
4
10 red balls, 10 red balls,
9 of them with a black spot 1 of them with a black spot
2 white balls 50 white balls
Kaufmann asks whether strength of belief in
(1) If I pick a red ball, it will have a black spot
ought to be `high', `fty-fty', or `low'. Kaufmann writes:
The judgment of nine out of ten informants to whom I posed this question
in an informal survey, as well as my own intuition, is that the answer
should be `low'.
Accordingly, Kaufmann postulates a new, \local" method of calculating a probability
for (1). This method may be motivated as follows. Consider an \expert" who knows
which bag is in play. (Kaufmann doesn't resort to this device, but it's useful.) By
Expert Reection, our credence in (1) ought to be the expectation of the expert's
credence in (1). If it's Bag X, the expert's credence in (1) will be 9
10
(Kaufmann
assumes that speakers do defer to conditional probability, conditional on the bag
being xed), and if it's Bag Y the expert's credence in (1) will be 1
10
. So our credence
in (1) (says Kaufmann) might plausibly be
1
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(2) Pl(R! B) = P (R! BjX)P (X) + P (R! BjY )P (Y )
= P (BjRX)P (X) + P (BjRY )P (Y ) = ( 9
10
)(1
4
) + ( 1
10
)(3
4
) = 3
10
.
(See Section 2 for more on the above display.) Here of course B =Black Spot, R =Red,
etc. Kaufmann contrasts (2) with what he calls the \global" interpretation (i.e. the
interpretation consistent with The Thesis):
(3) Pg(R! B) = P (BjRX)P (XjR) + P (BjRY )P (Y jR) = P (BjR) =
6
10
.
He calls the move from P (X) in (2) to P (XjR) in (3) an \abductive inference to the
best explanation for the (hypothetical) observation that the ball is red," observing
that \This step is evidently not performed by those who give the conditional (1) a
`low' rating."
Kaufmann's work has been inuential. Michael Zhao (2014), in particular, attempt-
s to characterize the conditions under which a \local" reading exists.1 As to the
descriptive aspects of Kaufmann's work, we are at least intrigued. Something like
the local interpretation may be what some speakers use, at least some of the time.
(Though our own \informal survey" suggests an approximate wash in the Bags-and-
Balls case; see Section 3.) A further question is whether the local interpretation can
be employed as a basis for rational decision in some circumstances where local and
global interpretations come apart. Kaufmann attempts to establish that it can, but
this attempt founders on a mathematical error, as we observe in Section 4.
There is already one critical reply (Douven 2008) to Kaufmann's paper in the liter-
ature. Is there really need for another? We believe that there is, for at least four
reasons. First, Douven's main argument is that the local interpretation is inconsis-
tent. To show this, he changes the partition (here fX; Y g) used in the calculation
(2) to come up with a value dierent than 3
10
. We don't consider this to be damaging
to Kaufmann's position; indeed (3) already accomplishes this much, being a version
of (2) for the trivial partition fX _ Y g, and it yields a value dierent from 3
10
. What
Kaufmann would say here, we think, is that the local interpretation is consistent, but
dependent on the choice of partition{so that one ought, technically, to speak of the
\local interpretation relative to 
", where 
 is a partition.
1In his paper's nal section, \Causation and the origin of local conditionals" Zhao writes: \What
is the purpose of having such a way of evaluating conditionals, given that, evaluated this way,
their probability does not reect the credence we should have in the consequent upon observing the
antecedent? Call causal conditionals any conditional whose assertibility depends on the existence
of a causal relation between the antecedent and consequent: for example, `If the Fed lowers interest
rates, then stock prices will go up.' Here...there are two natural readings: one on which we pretend
to observe the antecedent, and one on which we pretend to intervene causally to make the antecedent
so. ...the rst is just the global reading, and the second, the local reading." The problem we have
with the second reading is that to \pretend to intervene causally to make the antecedent so" is
to pretend also that the probabilities are dierent than they actually are{indeed, it is to pretend
that the global probability of the conditional is the same as its local probability is actually. In the
balls and bags scenario, for example, one could pretend that the bag is just translucent enough that
one can \make the antecedent so" by choosing a red ball intentionally, or that one can \make the
antecedent so" by sampling balls and throwing them back until one has got a red one. Conditional
on the chooser's determination to get a red ball, however, P (BjR) is then no longer 6
10
, but 3
10
. So
this is hardly any way to generate sympathy for the idea that the global reading isn't always salient.
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Second, Douven does little to undermine the claim that the local interpretation is
predictive of speaker attitude. Indeed, we think this is a rather hard task, owing to the
fact that Kaufmann was denitely onto something: it does appear that many speakers
do report something like local probabilities, at least some of the time. However, it isn't
hard to show that local interpretation commits speakers to combinations of attitudes
that, intuitively, cohere very poorly. This strategy, which we pursue in Section 3, is
we think very promising, and is, so far as we know, unique to the literature.
Third, Douven does not satisfactorily rebut Kaufmann's claims of rational ecacy
for the local interpretation. Kaufmann's rhetoric places a great deal of importance
on this claim{he essentially concedes that if there aren't scenarios where speakers
are justied in basing decisions on locality, there is no reason to think that the local
interpretation isn't a mere fallacy.2 But the scenario that he claims does this work
does not, owing to a mathematical error. Douven (in his footnote 4) misdiagnosed
the example as a case in which true credence and rational action come apart.
Finally, Kaufmann doesn't indicate clearly what he takes conditional sentences to
mean; indeed, he doesn't even indicate whether or not he takes them to have truth
conditions. Taking cues from his exposition, we pinpoint his commitments and pro-
vide, based on these, a semantic model for the local interpretation. The model, which
is based on Van Fraassen's (1976) model in support of Adams' Thesis, brings into
relief the (very close) relationship between the two theories. All the more so, in fac-
t, in that Van Fraassen's model is only technically appropriate for agents who are
certain that their credences are ideal. In the more typical case of an agent with a
distribution over the ideal credences that is not concentrated at a point, the correct
model to employ (as even Thesis supporters must acknowledge) is formally equivalent
to a local interpretativist one.
2. Triviality, Total Probability and the Resilient Equation
Our rst task is to pin down Kaufmann's position precisely, and oer a model for its
semantics.
In the rst line of (2) there appears to be an appeal to the law of total probability
P (A) =
nX
i=1
P (Bi)P (AjBi) for any partition fB1; : : : ; Bng (TP )
over the partition fX; Y g, with A the conditional (R ! B). In the second line,
meanwhile, the identity P (R ! BjX) = P (BjRX) is used; Fitelson (2015) refers
to this identity as the \Resilient Equation". The conjunction of these practices,
taken as generally valid rules, has been shown to imply \triviality" by David Lewis
(1976). Lewis employs (TP ) for A! C over the partition fC;:Cg. This appears to
commit Thesis defenders who accept the Resilient Equation to the absurd conclusion
P (A! C) = P (C), which shows in its turn that no Thesis-friendly probability space
2We make no such claim, though we do think that most speakers who appear on the surface to
be local interpretivists are, to the contrary, just probabilistically naive speakers who are attempting
to report a conditional probability and getting it wrong. We take issue, that is, with Kaufmann's
claim that speakers employ this very theoretical device \widely and systematically".
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admits of a three cell measurable partition fE1; E2; E3g with positive measure cells:
otherwise, one could set A = E1 [ E2 and C = E1 [ E3.
Thesis defenders therefore face a choice. Either they must disavow that (TP ) applies
to conditionals, or they must disavow the Resilient Equation. Kaufmann (who grants
that \The Thesis generally accords well with pre-theoretical intuitions", and generally
admits that the global reading is always available) disavows the Resilient Equation.
For though he uses it in (2), he notes that it is `not warranted by an \ocial"
rule of the probability calculus', suggesting that its legitimacy there is exceptional.3
Even so, as a sometime employer of this equation, he feels obligated to at least
address the threat of \triviality", writing \I do not claim that conditionals have local
interpretations with respect to just any variable."
Lewis (1976) discusses two types of Thesis proponents{those for whom conditionals
are propositions, so that their \probabilities" are true probabilities, and those for
whom conditionals are not propositions, so that their \probabilities" are \assertabili-
ties", \felicities" or other \ersatz probabilities". The former are obligated to deny the
Resilient Equation; the latter are obligated to deny the Law of Total Probability (as
applied to conditionals). Those who believe conditionals to be propositions believe
them to be highly context-sensitive; those who believe they aren't employ a highly
non-classical notion of (ersatz) conditional probability. Stalnaker and Van Fraassen
are of the rst type, Adams is of the second. Kaufmann's position is close enough to
that of a Thesis defender that he must, to some approximation, fall into one camp or
the other. Since he uninchingly employs the Law of Total Probability, but ags his
one use of the Resilient Equation as exceptional, we judge him to fall into the rst:
he views conditionals as genuine (context sensitive) propositions.
This is enough information to evolve Van Fraassen's model for Thesis abidement into
a semantics for the local interpretation. We relegate this task to an appendix, as it is
orthogonal to our primary purpose, but it's an important exercise in that it shows the
local interpretation to be coherent and not to lapse into triviality. Another reason it's
important is that Van Fraassen's model is technically appropriate only in the rare case
that the agent knows herself to maintain ideal credences. In cases where the agent's
distribution over the ideal credence function fails to be concentrated at a point, Van
Fraassen's model must be modied so as to become formally equivalent to the local
interpretation model. Kaufmann's position is, therefore, not an idle curiosity.
3. On the intuitions underwriting the local interpretation
Despite its virtues, the local interpretation is, we think, widely misunderstood. Kauf-
mann, in particular, believes that the local interpretation is applied by speakers
\widely and systematically". We doubt this. Speakers who answered \low" to Kauf-
mann's original question aren't, for the most part, local interpretivists; they are global
interpretivists who are bad at computing conditional probabilities.
3Douven (2008) appears to agree, stating that the rst line of (2), \being a mere application of
the law of total probability, is unassailable."
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Assume for example that after the draw mentioned in (1) you'll continue to draw
balls from the (same) bag, without replacement. We take the status of (1) to be the
same in this revised scenario; in particular it still has local probability 3
10
with respect
to fX; Y g. Consider:
(4) If I pick a red ball rst, the rst red ball picked will have a black spot
and
(5) If I pick a white ball rst, the rst red ball picked will have a black spot
Notice that (4) is essentially equivalent to (1). In particular it has the same local
probability, 3
10
, and (owing to the equivalence), ought to have similar \salience". But
the local probability of (5) is also equal to 3
10
. Local interpretivists should, therefore,
report equal strengths of belief in (4) and (5). Our intuition was that most speakers
would not. In an informal survey, only of 5 of 16 calculus students did. (6 reported
higher strength of belief in (4), 2 reported higher strength of belief in (5), and 3
answered "Does not exist".)
A more extreme example: imagine that someone present (Rose) knows which bag is
in play. Presently you will ask her which. She's pretty reliable; you think there is a
probability of .999 that she will report the correct bag. Consider
(6) If Rose says \Bag Y is in play" then Bag Y is in play
(7) If Rose says \Bag X is in play" then Bag Y is in play
The local interpretivist has strength of belief 3
4
in each of (6), (7). But it's beyond far-
fetched that many speakers would pretheoretically assign (6) and (7) equal strengths
of belief. The best explanation for this is the obvious one: local interpretation is not
something that speakers do \widely and systematically". (Perhaps they do it widely,
but they don't do it systematically.) Most don't report strengths of belief consistent
with the local interpretation when correlations are obvious, which suggests that they
do it in oblique cases only because they fail to judge that (or how) the relevant
antecedents correlate with the corresponding background variables.
Another reason to think that local interpretation isn't intuitively attractive is that it
violates the following intuitive desideratum.4
Weights: Suppose fA1; : : : ; Ang is a partition of event space. For any event C,
minfP (Ai ! C) : i = 1; : : : ; ng  P (C)  maxfP (Ai ! C) : i = 1; : : : ; ng.
Note that if Weights is satised, P (C) is always a weighted average of the values
P (Ai ! C).
5 To motivate the independent plausibility of Weights, consider the
(pre-theoretical) awkwardness of the following combination of attitudes:
(i) strength of belief in \if we watch the game then we'll order pizza" is 1
2
;
(ii) strength of belief in \if we don't watch the game then we'll order pizza" is 1
2
;
(iii) strength of belief in \we'll order pizza" is 1
3
.
4The law of total probability agrees with Weights under The Thesis. More generally, if C is a
conditional D ! E, where D and E are in the event space, then under The Thesis P (C) = P (EjD)
is, by (TPC), a weighted average of fP (Ai ! C) : i = 1; : : : ; ng = fP (EjDAi) : i = 1; : : : ; ng:
5This is trivial; every element of a closed bounded interval is a weighted average of its endpoints.
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Such combinations are realized under local interpretation. Consider the following:
P (Bag X) = 1
2
P (Bag Y ) = 1
2
10 red balls, 20 red balls,
9 of them with a black spot 2 of them with a black spot
20 white balls 10 white balls
2 of them with a black slot 9 of them with a black spot
Suppose you are about to start picking a balls uniformly at random from whichever
of the two bags is before you. Local interpretivists will subscribe to:
(I) strength of belief in \if I pick a red ball rst, the rst ball picked will have a
black spot" is 1
2
;
(II) strength of belief in \if I pick a white ball rst, the rst ball picked will have
a black spot" is 1
2
;
(III) strength of belief in \the rst ball picked will have a black spot" is 11
30
.
Philosophers having a theoretical story to tell about local interpretation will explain
such examples away, of course, but the majority of speakers (who aren't theorists) will
reject such combinations of attitudes out of hand.6 Therefore, we hold that similarity
between majority speaker response and the local interpretation is accidental.
4. On a book of bets said to support the local interpretation
In Section 7 of his paper, Kaufmann writes:
Assuming that the present proposal is descriptively correct, it raises a
deeper question: Is it an account of a fallacy{one that is committed widely
and systematically, but fallacious nonetheless{or is the departure from
(The Thesis), at least in some circumstances, the \correct" interpretation
of a conditional? (...) Are there situations in which it would be detrimental
to base one's actions upon (The Thesis) and advantageous to follow the
local interpretation? A negative answer would not imply that the local
interpretation is not what speakers use, but only that it is not what they
should use.
Kaufmann claims that the answer is \not negative". In support of this claim, he sets
up the following scenario. At time 0, B pays a bookie P (CjA). X's return on the
wager is: P (CjA) if :A, 1 if AC, 0 if :CA. B regards this wager as fair.
Between time 0 and time 1, both B and the bookie will learn whether A is true, but
if in fact A is true the bookie will nd out, in addition, \in what way" it is true,
i.e. which of AX1; : : : ; AXn is true, \where the Xi are the values of some variable X
that we take to be causally relevant.... The conditional probability of C is not evenly
6In a previous draft, we examined cases such as Q = \If the rst two picks are red with black
spots, the third pick will be white." The local probability of Q is not dened (since the conjunction
of Y with \the rst two picks are red with black spots" is null), yet speakers overwhelmingly report
non-vacuous strengths of belief (most often reverting to the global probability 2
10
, in our informal
survey) for Q. Such \strength of belief pluralism" is disconcerting, particularly in that few speakers
are likely to take themselves to employ dierent methods in their evaluations of Q and (1).
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distributed over all AXi, and X does not causally depend on A." B will not have
this additional information, but does know that the bookie will have it.
At time 1, B perceives her expected net payo to be zero. (If :A she knows that
payo to be exactly zero, and if A she knows it will be 1 P (CjA) if C and  P (CjA)
otherwise, the former with probability P (CjA).) The bookie's expected payo, how-
ever (from her own perspective), can be positive or negative. If negative, she would
like to make a new bet to exactly cancel the rst.
Although this bet looked fair to B prior to the oer of it, the mere fact that the bookie
wants to make it is evidence, for B, that she should not. Kaufmann claims (equation
30 in his paper) that the bookie's expected payo at time 0 is now curiously inuenced
by B's refusal to do business with the bookie at time 1. Indeed, he claims that it
is now \the weighted sum of these posterior payos for each Xi:
P
Xi2X
(P (CjA)  
P (CjAXi))P (Xi)."
That isn't right. Expected payo for the bookie onAXi is indeed P (CjA) P (CjAXi),
but on :AXi it is zero. The correct time zero expectation is therefore
X
Xi2X
(P (CjA)  P (CjAXi))P (AXi)
=
X
Xi2X
P (CA)
P (A)

P (AXi) 
X
Xi2X
P (CAXi)
P (AXi)

P (AXi) = P (CA)  P (CA) = 0:
The fair price for the wager, therefore, is Pg((A ! C) = P (CjA), not Pl(A ! C)
as Kaufmann (based on the fact that
P
Xi2X
(Pl(A ! C)   P (CjAXi))P (Xi) = 0)
claims. It is implicit that Kaufmann thinks the fair price is the probability we should
assign the conditional A! C, so this is actually an argument for The Thesis.
5. Appendix: Semantics for The Thesis and the Local Interpretation
Thesis proponents face pitfalls. For an example, assume that fA;B;C;Dg partitions
event space into equal measure events. A Thesis literalist might be tempted to write
P (:D ! A) = P (Aj:D) =
1
3
(5.1)
6=
1
2
= P (A _D)P (AjA) + P (B _ C)P (AjB _ C)(5.2)
=P (A _D)P (:D ! AjA _D) + P (B _ C)P (:D ! AjB _ C):(5.3)
Passage from (5.2) to (5.3) goes, e.g., by the Resilient Equation which, recall, says
that P (X ! Y jZ) = P (Y jXZ) in general. A Thesis defender ought (so it might
seem) to endorse the Resilient Equation, because if she were to learn Z, her new
probability function would be Q() = P (jZ), and the resilient equation looks to
follow in a line or two from Q(X ! Y ) = Q(Y jX). However, if we accept the
Resilient Equation then (5.1)-(5.3) appears to violate the Law of Total Probability.
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Thesis proponents have two options for explaining this away that are worth consid-
ering. In the rst, indicative conditionals aren't propositions, and have neither truth
conditions nor true probabilities. On this view, it would be better to write, say,
P (:D ! A) = P (Aj:D) =
1
3
6=
1
2
= P (A _D)P (:D ! AjA _D) + P (B _ C)P (:D ! AjB _ C):
Here P (Z ! W jK) = P (W jZK) (by denition) whenever Z and K are classical
events (i.e. sentences containing no occurence of \!"). P  might be said to denote
\assertability", \felicity", \strength of belief" or some other such notion, and would
not be assumed to obey the probability axioms. It would have a few probability-like
features (whatever is inherited from its denition), but lack others. Changing to P 
the instances of P evaluated at conditionals in (5.1)-(5.3) would thus eliminate the
apparent violation of the Law of Total Probability there. Lewis (1976) writes:
Adams himself seems to favor this hypothesis about the semantics of condi-
tionals. ...I have no conclusive objection to the hypothesis that indicative
conditionals are non-truth-valued sentences, governed by a special rule of
assertability that does not involve their non-existent probabilities of truth.
I have an inconclusive objection, however: ...(a) need to explain away all
seeming examples of compound sentences with conditional constituents.
Such compound sentences appear to be well-formed and sometimes useful. (\That
car is old, and if you honk its horn, a fuse will blow out.") Under the current proposal,
the rules for assigning them ersatz (conditional) \probability" would include
P ((A! C) ^B) = P (BjA)P (A! CjB)
=P (BjA)P (CjAB) = P (BCjA) = P (A! BC):
The proponent of this method will, in particular, deny the more familiar-looking
identity P ((A ! C) ^ B) = P (B)P (A ! CjB). On this account, the following
\Total Law of Probability for Conditionals" replaces the usual Law:
P (A! C) =
nX
i=1
P (BijA)P
(A! CjBi) for any partition fB1; : : : ; Bng: (TPC)
Note the corresponding identity P (CjA) =
Pn
i=1 P (BijA)P (CjABi). So this method
of explaining away (5.1)-(5.3) is to hold onto the Resilient Equation and simply assert
that the law corresponding to the Law of Total Probability for conditionals is (TPC).7
The second method is to relinquish the Resilient Equation by giving conditionals
truth conditions (and hence true probabilities) in accord with The Thesis. We'll adapt
7This account of ersatz conditional probabilities appears also to sidestep triviality arguments
such as that of Lewis (1976) and Fitelson (2015).
ADAMS THESIS AND THE LOCAL INTERPRETATION OF CONDITIONALS 9
an approach from Van Fraassen (1976).8 Let N denote the set of natural numbers
(with zero). Let (A; P ) be the agent's personal probability space (here A is a nite
Boolean algebra of \classical events" and P a probability function having domain
A). Denote by 
 the set of ordinal numbers f
Pk
i=0 ni!
i : k 2 N; n1; : : : ; nk 2 Ng.
For each  2 
, independently sample x, an atomic event in A, in accord with the
probability function P . (One says that one is conducting \Bernoulli trials".) Let Q
be product measure on the set of functions taking 
 to the set of atomic events in A.
Given the complete sampling fx :  2 
g, an event A 2 A0 = A is true at  if and
only if x  A. A degree 1 conditional, i.e. a conditional having the form A ! C,
where A;C 2 A0, is true at  if and only if x+k  C, where k is the least natural
number such that x+k  A. Let A1 be the Boolean algebra generated by A0 and the
degree 1 conditionals. A degree 2 conditional is a conditional not having lesser degree
and having the form A! C, where each of A;C 2 A1. Such a conditional is true at
 if and only if x+k!  C, where k is the least natural number such that x+k!  A.
Let A2 be the Boolean algebra generated by A1 and the degree 2 conditionals.
Continue in this fashion. Having constructed the nite Boolean algebra Am, dene a
degree m+ 1 conditional to be a conditional not having lesser degree and having the
form A! C, where each of A;C 2 Am. Such a conditional is true at  if and only if
x+k!m  C, where k is the least natural number such that x+k!m  A. Let Am+1
be the Boolean algebra generated by Am and the degree 1 conditionals. Finally, for
any sentence A, let P (A) = Q(\A is true at 0").
The proof of Thesis conrmation is trivial. For sentences A and B, let m be the
least natural number such that fA;Bg  Am. (So that A ! B is a degree m + 1
conditional.) Let x = P (A) and let y = P (A ^ B). The event \A ! B is true at
0" is the disjoint union of the events \A ^ B is true at 0", \A is false at zero and
A^B is true at !m", \A is false at zero and !m and A^B is true at 2!m", .... Thus
P (A! B) = Q(\A! B true at 0") = y+(1  x)y+(1  x)2y+    = y
x
= P (BjA).
This proof highlights the role of the independence of the trials: the truth of A at 0
shouldn't correlate with the truth of A at any other  = k 2 N (for classical events
A); the truth of A! B at 0 shouldn't correlate with the truth of A! B at any other
ordinal  = k! (for classical events A, B), etc. This assumption is only realistic,
however, when the agent's distribution over the \ideal credence function" (given her
epistemic position) over A0 is concentrated at a point.
Since the probability of a conditional is a true probability on this approach, the Law of
Total Probability will be valid under its auspices. The Resilient Equation, however,
fails. For example, the passage from P (:D ! AjA ^ D) in (5.2) to P (AjA) = 1
in (5.3) is denied. In fact, :D ! A will come out false whenever x0 = D and
8Our model was developed independently of (if decades later than) Van Fraassen's, which may
serve to indicate that it isn't as arbitrary as it might appear (to some). Van Fraassen's method,
incidentally, only succeeds in verifying the Thesis (which he attributes to Stalnaker) for relatively
simple conditionals, namely of the forms A ! B, (A ! B) ! C and A ! (B ! C). Though
our approach treats more general indicative conditionals, there is a small cost{we are forced to use
dierent \closeness" relations for conditionals of dierent complexities. This approach therefore
does not arise from Stalnaker's semantics precisely. (This was one of Van Fraassen's concerns.)
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x1 2 fB;Cg. It's important to note that this doesn't imply that the agent's Thesis-
abiding habits aren't \resilient" under conditionalization. Should the agent learn
that A _ D obtains, she will come to have full credence in the proposition she will
then express using the sentence \:D ! A"; this just won't be the same proposition
that she intended by that sentence before. Lewis wrote of such context sensitivity:
But presumably our indicative conditional has a xed interpretation, the
same for speakers with dierent beliefs, and for one speaker before and
after a change in his beliefs. Else how are disagreements about a condi-
tional possible, or changes of mind? Our question, therefore, is whether
the indicative conditional might have one xed interpretation that makes
it a probability conditional for the entire class of all those probability
functions that represent possible systems of beliefs.
To understand Lewis's objection, let's go back to the agent who originally holds that
:D ! A is true at 0 when, in a sequence of possible (A _ B _ C _ D) worlds, the
\nearest" (i.e. least index) (A _B _C)-world is an A world. When the agent learns
that, actually, A_D holds, the possible (B _C) worlds lose salience; either they are
to be dropped from the agent's model altogether or the model should be altered, and
these worlds pushed \further away" from 0 than the (A _ D) worlds. (Recall, this
is epistemic possibility we are working with.) Either way, the agent comes to regard
:D ! A as almost surely true; all of the nearest :D worlds are A worlds.
Van Fraassen blames Lewis's modal realism for a refusal to admit updating of more
concrete aspects of model structure (the nearness relation on possible worlds, in
particular) upon revision. That isn't fair, though, because Lewis doesn't want to
involve possible worlds at all in xing the meaning of the indicative conditional.
(He only wants that for the counterfactual conditional; he regards the indicative as
having truth conditionals equivalent to the material conditional.) Lewis's complaint
remains, and Van Fraassen (like any Thesis proponent who advocates for indicative
conditional truth values) must simply bite the bullet on context sensitivity.
The Van Fraassen model must be tweaked in an obvious way whenever one's distri-
bution over the \true" chances isn't concentrated at a point. Suppose for example
that in Kaufmann's original example, the identity of the bag in play is completely
determined by the answer to the following question:
Question. Let an = 6
n + 8n. Determine the remainder upon dividing a83 by 49.
Suppose an agent understands the question perfectly well, and knows how to answer
it, albeit not quickly. They've been told that the answer is either 7 or 35. If it is 7,
Bag Y is before them. If it is 35, Bag X is before them. They assign the proposition
that it is 7 probability 3
4
, so that is the probability they assign to Bag Y . So the
situation is exactly as in Kaufmann's original question.
Or is it? If the answer to Question is 7, then it is necessarily 7. So if it is 7, there
aren't any \possible worlds" where it's 35. If the agent applies the Van Fraassen
model naively under her epistemic credences, however, she'll get a sample array of
ersatz possible worlds, some of which will be 7-worlds, and some of which will be
35-worlds. That seems wrong. Instead, she should employ two separate functions
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from ordinal numbers to atoms. In one the implied sampling of the balls will be as
they would be if Bag X were in play. In the other, the implied sampling will be as
they would be if Bag Y were in play. One of the implied sampling distributions is
apocryphal (the associated worlds aren't possible), though the agents doesn't know
which. One model structure (the 7-world model) assigns (1) probability 1
10
. The other
(the 35-world model) assigns (1) probability 9
10
. So the agent assigns (1) probability
3
4
( 1
10
) + 1
4
( 9
10
) = 3
10
; the local probability. If she were an ideal agent, she'd know that
the answer to Question is in fact 35, and would assign (1) a probability of 9
10
.
What's dierent about Kaufmann's original setup? Arguably little. Perhaps now
our agent does have ideal credences (which bag is in play it determined, say, by coin
toss), and there are possible worlds of both types (Bag X worlds, and Bag Y worlds).
What's to stop Kaufmann from claiming, however, that if the bag in play is Bag X
(say) then all of the Bag X worlds are nearer than all of the Bag Y worlds? Nothing
whatsoever. He can make that claim if he wants to. (It seems that he does.) That
the claim is plausible is grounds for concluding that local interpretation theorists are
on solid enough ground. (As solid, at least, as that of Van Fraassen 1976.)
On the other hand, Kaufmann's hypothesis that \many" speakers employ the local
interpretation is supported by neither intuition nor empirical considerations. Kauf-
mann forged this hypothesis on the scant \evidence" that 9 out of 10 speakers he
interviewed assigned (1) \low" strength of belief. But this result (if it can be con-
sistently replicated, which we frankly doubt) is consistent with many hypotheses. It
was premature to conclude that such speakers are theoretical local interpretivists.
(And to think than an example like the one we criticized in Section 4 might work
was wishful thinking.) Contrasting pairs such as (6) and (7) appear to indicate, to
the contrary, that most were probably \fair weather" local interpretivists at best.
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